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Abstract
Product reviews and ratings on e-commerce websites provide customers with detailed in-
sights about various aspects of the product such as quality, usefulness, etc. Since they influence
customers’ buying decisions, product reviews have become a fertile ground for abuse by sellers
(colluding with reviewers) to promote their own products or to tarnish the reputation of com-
petitor’s products. In this paper, our focus is on detecting such abusive entities (both sellers
and reviewers) by applying tensor decomposition on the product reviews data. While tensor
decomposition is mostly unsupervised, we formulate our problem as a semi-supervised binary
multi-target tensor decomposition, to take advantage of currently known abusive entities. We
empirically show that our multi-target semi-supervised model achieves higher precision and recall
in detecting abusive entities as compared to unsupervised techniques. Finally, we show that our
proposed stochastic partial natural gradient inference for our model empirically achieves faster
convergence than stochastic gradient and Online-EM with sufficient statistics.
1 Introduction
Product reviews and ratings on e-commerce websites provide customers with detailed insights about
various aspects of the product. Ratings allow customers to gauge the quality of the product as per-
ceived by other customers who have bought the product. Consequently, customers rely significantly
on product reviews and ratings while making buying decisions on e-commerce platforms. Given
their influence on customer spends, product reviews are a fertile ground for abuse.
A common form of abuse involves a seller running campaigns soliciting fake, genuine-looking
positive reviews, for their own products or fake negative reviews about their competitors’ products.
The paid reviewers have a varied modi operandi. They can either create their own account and
start posting paid reviews (fake reviews) or they can hijack an inactive account in good standing
to post seemingly innocuous reviews from that account. There are also businesses/agencies which
promise a fee for writing fake reviews on Amazon. Figure 1 shows a social media snippet (name
anonymized) of a seller or an agency soliciting reviewers for a fee. To circumvent identification,
paid reviewers also distribute the volume of fake reviews across multiple accounts.
In order to maintain customer’s trust on the reviews and in turn on the e-commerce platform,
it is imperative for e-commerce websites to ensure that the reviews remain sacrosanct. As a re-
sult, identifying and taking enforcement actions on fake reviews, paid reviewers and the underlying
abusive sellers is a significant focus area within e-commerce companies. In this paper, we broadly
focus on the problem of detecting abusive entities (sellers and reviewers) within the product re-
views’ ecosystem. We formalize the interactions between sellers, products and reviewers as a binary
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Figure 1: Seller/agency soliciting fake reviewers.
tensor. Tensors are multidimensional arrays [KB09] and are used in capturing multidimensional
features effectively. We subsequently apply tensor decomposition techniques to identify the dense
cores. These dense cores are treated as anomalous interactions within a tensor with predominantly
uniformly distributed interactions. Additionally, we use known abusive sellers and reviewers from
the past as partial supervision to further enhance the model, with each form of abuse as a separate
target signal. To summarize, our technical contributions are as follows:
1. We formulate detection of abusive entities (sellers and reviewers), a task of identifying dense
cores in the seller-reviewer bipartite graph, as a tensor decomposition problem.
2. We apply unsupervised Bayesian binary tensor decomposition to detect dense blocks in the
seller-reviewer relationship. This is based on the Logistic CP tensor decomposition model.
3. We then develop semi-supervised binary multi-target extension to the unsupervised model
(via Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation) so that we can incorporate prior information about
multiple forms of abuse to improve detection of abusive entities. We call our proposed ap-
proach SENTINEL.
4. Finally, we develop stochastic partial natural gradient learning for the semi-supervised model
and show that it empirically achieves faster convergence than stochastic gradient descent and
EM with sufficient statistics.
5. We show the efficacy of the proposed approach as compared to the state-of-the-art techniques
for tensor decomposition and review abuse detection.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a) semi-supervised multi-target binary tensor
decomposition has been applied to the problem of detecting fake entities in the review spam domain,
b) natural gradients has been used for inference within tensor decomposition. Although the paper
focuses on the problem formulation and scientific aspects of SENTINEL, we have additionally
developed an extensive platform that uses machine learning models to flag abusive entities. The
platform allows a combination of automated as well as manual enforcement. The feedback from the
enforcement gets channeled back into the platform to further enhance SENTINEL.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces related works as well as some
background regarding our application of tensor decomposition for detecting abuse in the seller-
reviewer relationship. Section 3 describes the baseline unsupervised binary tensor decomposition
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technique. Section 4 describes SENTINEL, encapsulating the semi-supervised multi-target exten-
sions. Section 5 describes our proposed stochastic partial natural gradient learning for the inference
of all the latent parameters of the semi-supervised model. Experimental results are shown in Section
6.
2 Related Work and Background
There has been a lot of attention recently to address the issue of finding fake reviewers in online
e-commerce platforms. Jindal et al. [JL07] were one of the first to show that review spam exists
and proposed simple text based features to classify fake reviewers.
Identifying Abusive Reviews: Abusive reviewers have grown in sophistication ever since the
initial efforts [JL07, JB08], employing professional writing skills to avoid detection via text-based
techniques. In [FBC12], the authors have proposed stylistic features derived from the Probabilistic
Context Free Grammar parse trees to detect review spam. To detect more complex fake review
patterns, researchers have proposed 1) graph based approaches such as approximate bipartite cores
and lockstep behavior detection among reviewers [LMCH16, BXG+13, HSB+16b, JCB+15], 2) tech-
niques to identify network footprints of reviewers in the reviewer product graph [YA15], and 3) using
anomalies in ratings distribution [HSB+16a]. Some recent research has pointed at the importance
of time in identifying fake reviews since it is critical to produce as many reviews as possible in a
short period of time to be economically viable. Methods exploiting temporal and spatial features
related to reviewers/reviews [LCM+15, YKA16], as well as the sequence of reviews [LZW+14] have
been proposed. While it is not possible to capture all the work on review spam detection, [CKP+15]
provides a broad coverage of efforts in this area.
Tensor based methods: Techniques such as CrossSpot [JBC+15], M-Zoom [SHF16], and
MultiAspectForensics [MGF11] propose identifying dense blocks in tensors or dense sub-graphs in
heterogeneous networks, which can also be applied to the problem of identifying fake reviewers.
M-Zoom is an improved version of CrossSpot that computes dense blocks in tensors which indicate
anomalous or fraudulent behavior. The number of dense blocks (i.e., sub-tensors) returned by M-
Zoom is configured a-priori. Note that the dense blocks identified may be overlapping, i.e., a tuple
could be included in two or more blocks. M-Zoom is used as one of the baseline unsupervised
methods in our experiments. MultiAspectForensics, on the other hand, automatically detects and
visualizes novel patterns that include bipartite cores in heterogeneous networks.
Tensor decomposition [SPBW15, HRC+15, RWG+14, RHHC15, RWC15] is also applied to detect
abusive entities (i.e., sellers and reviewers) since it facilitates the detection of dense bipartite sub-
graphs. Dense bipartite sub-graphs are indicative of suspicious behavior due to the following reason:
at any given time, there is a common pool of fake reviewers (paid reviewers) that are available and
who are willing to write a positive or negative review in exchange for a fee. Sellers recruit these
fake reviewers through an intermediary channel (such as social media groups, third party brokers,
etc.) as shown in Figure 2, where nodes on the left indicate sellers and nodes on the right indicate
reviewers and an edge indicates a written review. Note that a seller has to recruit a sizeable number
of fake reviewers in a short amount of time to make an impact on the overall product rating –
positive impact for her own products and negative impact for her competitor’s products. Given a
common pool of available fake reviewers at any given time, suspicious behavior manifests as dense
bipartite connections between a group of sellers and a group of reviewers with similar ratings, such
as near 5-star or near 1-star ratings. Hence the presence of a bipartite core (a dense bipartite
sub-graph) in some contiguous time interval ∆t is a strong indicator of abuse by the group of sellers
and reviewers involved.
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Intermediary
Sellers Fake Reviewers Sellers Fake Reviewers
Figure 2: Seller-Reviewer Abuse: key signals.
Therefore, our goal boils down to finding bipartite cores (or dense blocks) using the factor matri-
ces resulting from tensor decomposition. The modes of the tensor for our problem space correspond
to the seller, reviewer, product, rating, and time of review. The entities in the corresponding factor
matrices that have relatively higher values are indicative of abuse. By aggregating these abusive
entities across the modes of the tensor results in discovering bipartite cores, where each core consists
of a group of reviewers that provide similar rating across a similar set of sellers (and their products)
where all of these reviews are occurring within a short contiguous interval of time.
We have a small set of known abusive sellers and reviewers identified via manual audits. We
leverage the partial supervision to propose a semi-supervised extension to tensor decomposition to
detect new abusive entities with greater fidelity. To leverage correlations between different forms of
abuse (e.g., paid reviews abuse, abuse related to compromised accounts), we incorporate multiple
binary targets based on Logistic Model with Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation.
Natural gradient learning: Natural gradient learning [Ama98] is an alternative to traditional
gradient descent based learning. We develop stochastic partial natural gradient learning for the semi-
supervised tensor decomposition model and show that it empirically achieves faster convergence as
compared to stochastic gradient descent and EM with sufficient statistics.
3 Logistic CP Decomposition
Let X be a 3-mode (aka 3-way) tensor. CP decomposition of a tensor is defined as:
X =
R∑
r=1
λr~ar ~br  ~cr, (1)
where λr denotes the weight, ~ar, ~br, and ~cr are vectors (or rank-1 tensors) and  represents vector
outer product. R is called the rank of the tensor. CP Decomposition is a generalization of matrix
decomposition. Each tuple in Amazon’s review data captures the ‘reviewing/rating’ event wherein a
reviewer writes a review/rating at a specific time for a product sold by a seller. These relationships
can be described as a 5-way (or 4-way, if the seller is omitted) binary tensor. Such a binary tensor
is incomplete since not all reviewers would have rated all products. Hence, the elements of a binary
tensor can be modeled as being generated from a Logistic function, i.e., a value of 1 when the
relationship exists and value of 0 where relationships do not exist. In our probabilistic tensor
decomposition framework, we only consider those entries where a current relationship exists.
Logistic CP tensor decomposition is tensor CP decomposition in a probabilistic framework
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[RWG+14, RHHC15, RWC15]. The generative model for a K-mode tensor denoted by X is:
X ∼ f(∑Rr=1 λr~u(1)r  · · ·  ~u(K)r ),
δl ∼ Inv-Gamma(al, 1) : a1 = 1, al = a1 + (l − 1) 1R ,
τr =
∏r
l=1 δl,
λr ∼ N (0, τr),
µ
(k)
ik,r
∼ Inv-Gamma(ac, b2) : Our Enhancement,
u
(k)
ik,r
∼ N (0, µ(k)ik,r),
where f specifies the Bernoulli-Logistic function for the binary valued tensor. Let ~u
(k)
ik
denote the
R dimensional factor corresponding to entity ik in mode k. The number of non-zero values of ~λ
determines the rank of the tensor. Gaussian priors are assigned to the latent variables ~λ and ~u
(k)
ik
for
k ∈ [1,K]. The variance of the Gaussian prior for ~λ is controlled by a Multiplicative Inverse Gamma
Process [Dur16] that has the property of reducing the variance as r increases. To get closed-form
updates for all the latent variables, [RWG+14, RHHC15, RWC15] introduce additional variables,
denoted by ωi corresponding to each tuple i in the binary tensor that are Po´lya-Gamma distributed.
We assign an Inverse-Gamma hyper-prior to the variance of the Gaussian priors of ~u
(k)
ik
. The
reason for adding the Inverse-Gamma hyper-prior to the model is that it provides adaptive L2-
regularization. Hence, we can control the amount of regularization, i.e., provide different amounts
of regularization to factors of the mode(s) that have target information than those without target
information.
We use this unsupervised model as our base and develop multi-target semi-supervised extensions
to it as described in Section 4. [RWG+14, RHHC15, RWC15] propose using either sufficient statistics
(in batch EM or as online EM) or Gibbs sampling (in batch) for inference. They claim that the
online EM reaches reasonably good quality solutions fairly quickly as compared to their batch
counterparts in most situations. However, the online EM does scalar updates of each latent variable
that is inherently a vector of dimension R, and this may result in slower convergence. Alternatively,
we propose using partial natural gradient learning in a stochastic setting for inference that is both,
online in nature as well as allows vectorized updates for each of the latent variables.
4 Proposed Multi-Target Semi-Supervised Logistic CP Decompo-
sition
In this section, we describe SENTINEL, the semi-supervised extensions to the Logistic CP model
for detecting abusive sellers and reviewers. We have prior information associated with a subset of
the entities for at least one of the modes. This prior information is specified as binary target(s),
where each target corresponds to a specific type of abuse. The framework is called semi-supervised
tensor decomposition as the tensor decomposition is achieved by incorporating this prior data. The
intuition behind using the target information is that the patterns hidden in the known abusive
entities could be leveraged to discover, with greater precision, additional entities that have similar
signatures. We know that abusive behavioral patterns change as the entities continuously try to
game the system. We hypothesize that the proposed semi-supervised framework offers a way to
detect such changing behavior earlier and with greater efficiency as compared with unsupervised
techniques.
In multi-target semi-supervised tensor decomposition, one or more targets are specified for at
least one of the modes (denoted as ~z
(k)
l for target l in mode k). We drop the superscript (k) for
5
convenience. This is represented as a matrix where each column corresponds to a single target. For
each target:
1) Both positive and negative labels need to be specified.
2) Data can be specified for only a subset of the entities in that mode (semi-supervised learning).
The decomposition of the tensor is achieved by taking the multi-target label information across
the mode(s) into account. The label information corresponding to each target is predicted via its
own Logistic model whose coefficients are denoted as ~β
(k)
l for target l in mode k. We drop the
superscript (k) for convenience. For a given mode, the covariates of each Logistic model are the
same, i.e., the factors corresponding to the entities in that mode. The coefficients ~βl are assigned
Gaussian priors. Note that the Logistic model corresponding to each target is learnt by taking into
account the correlations of the binary labels from other targets, and therefore called as Multi-target
Learning. For each Logistic model, to get closed form updates, we introduce additional variables
denoted by νl that are Po´lya-Gamma distributed. Equation 8 in Appendix (Section A.2) shows
how the Logistic likelihood for each task l becomes a quadratic function in ~βl by augmenting the
data with νl.
Multi-Target Learning
Consider binary target information for mode k that is specified as an M×L matrix, where M
denotes the number of entities for which the targets are specified and L denotes the number of
tasks. Note that in the semi-supervised setting the binary target information is usually specified for
only a subset of the entities of some mode k. Based on the specified target information, the tensor
decomposition technique can infer the neighbors of these abusive entities. For example, if a seller
a is flagged as having review abuse, then the tensor decomposition technique would infer its factor
as a function of the reviewers associated with this seller during some time ∆t where the density is
high. This in turn would lead to detection of other sellers who are also connected to some subset of
these same reviewers during this same time interval. These other sellers would then end up having
a similar factor representation indicating a high probability of being abusive.
Given L tasks (where L > 1), the learning falls under the multi-target learning framework.
Multi-target learning takes into account the correlations (or a similarities) between the L tasks
to learn L different classifiers [HLHW15]. This is achieved via defining a L×L matrix where each
element l, j of that matrix, denoted by Ql,j , carry the reverse cosine information between the targets
l and j and is computed as:
Ql,j = 1− ~z
>
l ~zj
|~zl|.|~zj | .
The interpretation of this L×L matrix denoted by Q is easily understood by taking a single task
l as an example. Note that all the diagonal elements of Q are zero (by definition). For task l,
compute the following quantity given below:
e−
∑
j 6=lQl,j(~βl
> ~βj). (2)
Equation 2 can be regarded as an exponential distribution on ~βl (without the normalizing factor)
with a rate parameter equal to
∑
j 6=lQl,j . ~βj . We want to find a suitable ~βl given the rate parameter
such that it maximizes this exponential distribution. This is described considering the three extreme
cases:
1) If target l, j are negatively-correlated (cosine measure near −1 and Ql,j ∼ 2), then the coefficients
defining their respective classifiers need to be of opposite signs and similar magnitude. This implies
that the dot product ~βl
> ~βj is negative. And since Ql,j is positive, implies that the exponent is
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positive.
2) If target l, j are uncorrelated (cosine measure near 0 and Ql,j ∼ 1), then the coefficients defining
their respective classifiers need to be distinct as well. This implies that the dot product ~βl
> ~βj will
be closer to zero, meaning that the exponent is close to zero.
3) If target l, j are highly correlated (cosine measure near 1 and Ql,j ∼ 0), then the coefficients
defining their respective classifiers need to be very similar (same sign and similar magnitude). This
implies that the dot product ~βl
> ~βj will be positive. However, since Ql,j ∼ 0, implies that the
exponent will be close to zero.
To handle cases when the magnitude any of element(s) ~βj are very small or very large, we modify
equation 2 as given below:
e−
∑
j 6=lQl,j [~βl
>
Sign( ~βj)]. (3)
Taking the natural logarithm of equation 3 yields:
−
∑
j 6=l
Ql,j [~βl
>
Sign( ~βj)].
The Appendix (sections A.2 and A.3) describes the modeling of the L classifier models in a multi-
target framework jointly with the factors from the Logistic CP decomposition. Section A.1 in the
Appendix describes the modeling of the latent parameter ~λ. Next section describes our proposed
partial natural gradient inference for the multi-target semi-supervised Logistic CP model.
5 Partial Natural Gradients: Inference
Natural gradient is defined as the product of the Euclidean, i.e., standard gradient and the inverse
of the Fisher information matrix. Natural gradient learning in the context of online learning is
explained in [Ama98]. It is an optimization method that is traditionally motivated from the per-
spective of information geometry and works well for many applications as an alternate to stochastic
gradient descent [Mar14]. Natural gradient descent is generally applicable to the optimization of
probabilistic models. It has been shown that in many applications, natural gradients seem to require
far fewer total iterations than gradient descent, hence making it a potentially attractive alternate
method. However it has been known that for models with many parameters, computing the natural
gradient is impractical since it requires computing the inverse of a large matrix, i.e., the Fisher
information matrix. This problem has been addressed in prior works where an approximation to
the Fisher is calculated such that it is easier to store and invert than the exact Fisher.
The latent variables in our semi-supervised model that we need to infer are ~λ of length R, matrix
U (k) for each mode k ∈ [1,K] of dimension nk × R and ~β(k)l of length R + 1 for target l ∈ [1 : L]
in mode k ∈ [1,K]. The corresponding log-posteriors of these latent variables that we need to
maximize are denoted by log[g(~λ)] (defined in A.1), H(~u
(k)
ik=n
) (defined in A.3) and F (~β
(k)
l ) (defined
in A.2), respectively. Natural gradient update in iteration t is then defined as:
~λ(t) = ~λ(t−1) + γt.I(.)−1.E
[
∇~λ log[g(~λ)]
]
~u
(k)
ik=n,(t)
= ~u
(k)
ik=n,(t−1) + γt.I(.)−1.E
[
∇
~u
(k)
ik=n
H(~u
(k)
ik=n
)
]
~β
(k)
l,(t) =
~β
(k)
l,(t−1) + γt.I(.)−1.E
[
∇(k)~βl F (
~β
(k)
l )
]
,
(4)
where the learning rate γt in (4) is given by:
γt =
1
(τp + t)θ
.
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Note that θ is the forgetting rate and τp is the delay. The values for these are chosen such that
∑
t γ
2
t
is bounded but
∑
t γt is unbounded. I(.)−1 in (4) indicates the inversion of the Fisher information
matrix (square matrix) in each iteration. There are two difficulties:
1) Computation of the Fisher information matrix is usually not trivial since it may not lend itself
in a nice closed form.
2) Size of the Fisher information matrix in our data could possibly be in the tens of thousands or
more. This impacts scalability, i.e., could result in very expensive computations that might also
pose numerical stability issues leading to an intractable inverse computation.
For the first issue, we show that the Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation facilitates easy compu-
tation of the Fisher information matrix. The detailed derivations of the partial Fisher information
matrices as well as the gradients computations for each of the arguments, namely, ~λ, ~u
(1)
1 . . . ~u
(K)
nK
and ~β
(1)
l · · · ~β(K)L are sections B and C.
We have addressed the second issue by exploiting the problem structure which facilitates working
with partial Fisher information matrix (hence called partial natural gradients). Partial natural
gradients implies that we only work with diagonal blocks of the Fisher information matrix instead
of the full matrix. Note that in our problem structure, the loss function is quadratic in each of the
arguments (~λ, ~u
(1)
1 , . . . , ~u
(K)
nK ,
~β
(1)
l , . . . ,
~β
(K)
L ). Due to the individually quadratic nature of the loss
functions, each diagonal block is a symmetric positive definite matrix of size R × R for ~λ and ~u(k)nk
or (R+ 1)× (R+ 1) for ~β(k)l . Hence, the basic convergence guarantees for the full natural gradient
learning extends to the partial set up as well [BCN18]. We note that computation of the partial
Fisher information matrix is theoretically and numerically tractable as we are dealing with square
matrices of size R or (R+ 1), which is very small (value less than 10) in our problem space.
For scalability over very large data sets, typical of Amazon data, we have implemented partial
natural gradient learning in a stochastic setting. A concern here is that in each iteration, using a
mini-batch, we are obtaining a noisy estimate of the partial Fisher information matrix. A noisy
estimate of this matrix leads to a biased inverse since the mean of inverses is not equal to the inverse
of the mean. Hence, theoretical guarantees regarding faster convergence for partial natural gradients
in a stochastic setting as compared with stochastic gradients cannot be established. Another side-
effect of this noisy estimate is that the matrix may be highly ill-conditioned, and hence may lead
to numerical stability problems while computing its inverse. To circumvent this issue, we have
experimented with the conditioning of this matrix (conditioning implies adding a scaled diagonal
matrix) in either of the two ways. We can either use the prior of the corresponding latent variable to
scale the identity matrix and add this to the partial Fisher information matrix (denoted as natural
gradient 1). Or we can use the diagonal of the partial Fisher information matrix to scale the identity
matrix and add this to the partial Fisher information matrix (denoted as natural gradient 2).
So far, we have not come across any efforts that have applied partial natural gradient learning in
a stochastic setting for inference in Bayesian CP tensor decomposition. In section 6, we empirically
show that in the semi-supervised setting, on the test data, scalar updates of vector parameters
in Online-EM lead to very slow convergence and performance is sub-optimal w.r.t. ROC-AUC as
compared with the partial natural gradient and stochastic gradient algorithms. We also empirically
show that the partial natural gradient algorithm in a stochastic setting achieves faster convergence
than stochastic gradient learning in detecting both abusive sellers and reviewers on Amazon data
sets.
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6 Experimental Results
This section outlines our experiments to validate the efficacy of SENTINEL towards detecting en-
tities promoting review abuse.
Dataset: For all our experiments, we have taken a random sample of products from the Amazon
reviews dataset between 2017 and 2018. Not all reviews are associated with the purchase of a prod-
uct. As a result, considering only those reviews with an associated seller reduces the dataset size
by half. From the review data, we construct two datasets and correspondingly two separate binary
tensors - 1) SELLER-TENSOR captures the existing association of a reviewer r giving a numeric
rating n at time t for a product p from a seller s (5-mode tensor), and 2) NO-SELLER-TENSOR
captures the existing association of a reviewer r giving a numeric rating n at time t for a product p,
without the seller information (4-mode tensor). The former is used to detect abusive sellers, while
the latter is used to detect abusive reviewers. The modes of the two binary tensor are reviewer ID,
product ID, seller ID (if included), numeric rating and time. Note that numeric rating corresponds
to an integer between 1 to 5 and that time is converted to a week index.
SELLER-TENSOR consists of 25K reviewers, 475K products and 70K sellers. NO-SELLER-
TENSOR consists of 90K reviewers and 1.4M products. SELLER-TENSOR has 1.2M tuples,
resulting in an extremely sparse tensor with a density of 1.6 ∗ 10−8.
Benchmark Methods: To the best of our knowledge, the proposed binary multi-target semi-
supervised enhancement for a CP decomposition and its inference using partial natural gradients
are novel to this paper. However, tensor decomposition in general has been applied to detect abusive
entities in multi-modal data in the past. Hence, we benchmark the performance of our proposed
approach with the following tensor based approaches:
BPTF: Bayesian Poisson Tensor Factorization [SPBW15] is a Bayesian CP tensor decomposition
approach assuming a Poisson likelihood. The authors in [SPBW15] have implemented the unsuper-
vised BPTF model using a batch algorithm, but it does not seamlessly lend itself to semi-supervised
extensions.
M-Zoom: The authors in [SHF16] have proposed an unsupervised technique to identify dense blocks
in tensors or dense sub-graphs in heterogeneous networks, which can also be applied to identify abu-
sive sellers and reviewers.
Unsupervised BNBCP: Beta Negative-Binomial CP decomposition [HRC+15] is also a Bayesian CP
tensor decomposition approach, assuming a Poisson likelihood. The BNBCP model is a fully con-
jugate model and inference is done using Variational Bayes (VB). To be able to scale for massive
tensors, we have implemented an online VB version using Stochastic Variational Inference (SVI).
Semi-supervised BNBCP: Since the unsupervised BNBCP model can be easily extended to the semi-
supervised setting, we implemented a semi-supervised version. Note that this is a single target and
not a multi-target enhancement.
We use precision, recall and AUC against a test set to measure the performance of the above
approaches.
Experimental Validation: Our experiments consist of the following empirical evaluations:
1) Comparison between unsupervised and the proposed semi-supervised enhancements in detecting
abusive sellers and reviewers.
2) Impact of different inference techniques on the proposed semi-supervised enhancement.
3) Robustness of the proposed multi-target semi-supervised model to variations in the hyper-
parameters.
4) Stability of the proposed approach across many runs, owing to the non-convex nature of tensor
decomposition.
5) Scalability of the proposed approach.
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Table 1: Detecting abusive sellers: Comparison between benchmark methods. Note that the num-
bers are scaled.
Method Precision Recall F1 Score AUC
Un-Supervised
M-Zoom [SHF16] 0.61 0.74 0.67 -
BPTF [SPBW15] 0.53 0.79 0.63 0.74
BNBCP [HRC+15] 0.51 0.89 0.65 0.74
BNBCP [SVI ] 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.87
Semi-Supervised Logistic CP [Stochastic Gradient ] 0.89 0.94 0.91 0.88
(until convergence) Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 1 ] 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.88
Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 2 ] 0.84 0.94 0.89 0.88
Logistic CP [Stochastic Gradient ] 0.81 0.74 0.77 0.78
Semi-Supervised Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 1 ] 0.83 0.89 0.86 0.87
(stop at 200 iterations) Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 2 ] 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.85
6) Comparison with baseline models in terms of early detection of abusive reviewers and its impact
on customers viewing the reviews.
Within SENTINEL, we have chosen the following values for the learning rate parameters τp =
256 and θ = 0.61. We have chosen the following values for the parameters of the Inverse Gamma
distributions: ac = 1, b1 = 0.4 and b2 = 3. We have set the mini-batch size to 1024 in all our
simulations.
6.1 Detecting Abusive Sellers
In this experiment, we take a random sample of sellers who have been flagged, via manual audits,
for being guilty of review abuse. These are treated as positively labeled samples. In addition, we
have included a random sample of sellers who are currently not flagged for any kind of abuse. These
are treated as negatively labeled samples. Both these samples form the training dataset together.
We have taken an additional set of around 1% of sellers 1 as test set to measure the performance of
different techniques. The test set has a similar distribution as the training set and has been selected
from beyond the training time period. Table 1 shows that all four flavors of the semi-supervised
tensor decomposition have higher precision, recall and AUC as compared with the unsupervised
techniques - indicating that leveraging behavioral patterns from current abusive sellers improves
performance and fidelity in identifying new abusive sellers. Given the single type of seller abuse
(aka single target); both semi-supervised BNBCP and SENTINEL models have comparable AUC
performance. With early stopping of the semi-supervised models (200 iterations), we observe that
inference based on natural gradient outperforms stochastic gradient learning, indicating empirically
faster convergence of the former.
Note that M-Zoom does not produce the scores for each suspicious entity and hence the AUC is
not calculated. Due to this lack of scores per entity, we cannot rank the suspicious entities to be able
to apply different levels of enforcement actions against them. Among the unsupervised methods,
BNBCP has the best AUC, which is around 16% lower than the best semi-supervised approach.
The best performing unsupervised method in terms of precision is M-Zoom, which is around 46%
lower than the best semi-supervised approach.
Table 2 shows evidence from the review data indicating suspicious behavior for a representative
set of sellers that was predicted by SENTINEL to be abusive. Density indicates the ratio of bipartite
1High confidence abusive sellers are hard to obtain due to business reasons, hence the small test set.
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Table 2: Abusive sellers: evidence from review data.
Suspicious Seller # Suspicious Products # Suspicious Reviewers # Reviews Density
A 75 25 1802 0.96
B 16 9 132 0.91
C 7 19 114 0.86
Table 3: Detecting abusive reviewers: Comparison between benchmark methods. Note that the
numbers are scaled.
Method Precision Recall F1 Score AUC
Unsupervised
M-Zoom [SHF16] 0.53 0.70 0.60 -
BPTF [SPBW15] 0.42 0.54 0.47 0.51
BNBCP [HRC+15] 0.59 0.46 0.52 0.61
BNBCP [SVI ] 0.60 0.83 0.69 0.79
Semi-Supervised Logistic CP [Stochastic Gradient ] 0.60 0.90 0.72 0.85
(until convergence) Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 1 ] 0.62 0.91 0.74 0.85
Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 2 ] 0.59 0.91 0.72 0.85
Logistic CP [Stochastic Gradient ] 0.56 0.79 0.66 0.72
Semi-Supervised Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 1 ] 0.59 0.87 0.71 0.83
(stop at 600 iterations) Logistic CP [Natural Gradient 2 ] 0.58 0.86 0.69 0.82
connections (reviews) observed in the data to the maximum number of bipartite connections between
products from this seller and suspicious reviewers. These reviewers are most likely abusive since they
have written a review for practically all products by the seller. Since paid reviewer abuse mostly
manifests off-Amazon (e.g., funds transferred through bank), evidence gathered from review data is
indicative but not legally binding to qualify the sellers as fraudulent. Moreover, since enforcement
actions on false positives would impact revenue negatively, the thresholds for enforcement are quite
stringent. Majority of the sellers are warned based on the model’s recommendation.
Section D shows confidence intervals of the algorithms.
6.2 Detecting Abusive Reviewers
In this experiment, we have taken a random sample of reviewers, who have been identified to be
guilty of review abuse. Among these, roughly 60% belong to paid reviewer abuse category and
the remainder belong to the compromised account abuse category. Recall that the compromised
account abuse occurs when a good customer’s account is taken over by an abusive reviewer to post
fake reviews. SENTINEL supports multi-target labels in a semi-supervised setting. Hence, we treat
the two forms of abuse as two separate targets in our model. The BNBCP semi-supervised model,
on the other hand, does not support multiple targets. Hence there is no differentiation between
these two forms of abuse in the BNBCP semi-supervised model. A random sample of about 80% of
this data forms the training set and the remaining 20% forms the test set. Table 3 shows that all the
four variants of our semi-supervised tensor decomposition have higher precision, recall, and AUC
as compared with the unsupervised techniques. Recall and AUC have shown significant increase
between the unsupervised and semi-supervised methods, as compared to the precision. With early
stopping (600 iterations), we see that the natural gradient outperforms stochastic gradient learning,
indicating empirically faster convergence of the former. At full convergence, multi-target logistic
CP semi-supervised model exhibits better performance as compared with the semi-supervised model
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that is not designed to differentiate between different forms of abuse (i.e., BNBCP model). To test
the hypothesis that jointly learning separate models for each abuse type is better than learning a
single model for all abuse types, we experimented with using a single target which is the union of
the two abuse types in SENTINEL. Results indicated that we see an almost 3% gain in AUC in
predicting one of the targets in the multi-target scenario, hence confirming our hypothesis.
6.3 Stochastic Partial Natural Gradients versus Baseline Learning Methods
We apply multi-target semi-supervised Logistic CP tensor decomposition approach on Amazon
review data (SELLER-TENSOR for sellers and NO-SELLER-TENSOR for reviewers) to compare
the performance of two baseline learning methods, namely, sufficient statistics (Online-EM) and
stochastic gradient with the proposed stochastic partial natural gradient learning. As mentioned
in Section 5, we have two flavors of stochastic partial natural gradient learning, differing only by
the conditioning applied to the partial Fisher information matrix. Figure 3 shows the ROC-AUC
plot for detecting abusive sellers and abusive reviewers versus the iteration number. Solid red
plot corresponds to the stochastic partial natural gradient learning type 1, blue (dash-dot) plot
corresponds to stochastic partial natural gradient learning type 2, black dashed plot corresponds
to stochastic gradient learning and magenta (dash) plot corresponds to online EM with sufficient
statistics.
Stochastic gradient learning has a tendency to over-train since it is unable to shrink some of the
elements of ~λ towards zero as the tensor rank is less than R. Stochastic partial natural gradient
learning (both flavors) does not suffer from significant over-training since it is able to shrink 60% of
the values of λr towards zero within the first one thousand iterations. This leads to similar AUC on
train and test data sets for detecting both abusive sellers and abusive reviewers as compared with
the other two baselines. Stochastic partial natural gradient learning type 2 has a slightly slower
learning rate than type 1. Online-EM with sufficient statistics shows poorer performance on test
data (for both reviewers and sellers) when compared with stochastic gradient or partial natural
gradient learning.
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(a) Train data: sellers. (b) Train data: reviewers.
(c) Test data: sellers. (d) Test data: reviewers.
Figure 3: Efficiency of partial natural gradient learning in identifying abusive sellers and reviewers.
6.4 Sensitivity to Model Hyper-parameter
Impact of the scale parameter of the two Inverse-Gamma distributions (i.e., model hyper-parameters),
namely, b1 and b2 on F1 score in a semi-supervised setting is shown in Figure 4 (a) and (b). b1 (b2)
is the scale parameter of the Inverse-Gamma distribution that controls the variance of the Gaussian
prior for the factors that belong to the mode(s) associated with (without) multi-target data. b2
is also the scale parameter for the Inverse-Gamma distribution that controls the variance of the
Gaussian prior for the Logistic regression coefficients corresponding to each task l. b2 is set such
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that it offers very little regularization, i.e., set to a high value. However, b1 has to be chosen more
carefully such that it provides the right amount of regularization in the semi-supervised setting.
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(a) F1 Score versus b1 with b2 Fixed at 9.
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(b) F1 Score versus b2 with b1 Fixed at 0.4.
Figure 4: Impact of varying hyper-parameters on F1 Score.
In Figure 4 (a), we fix b2 to a arbitrarily high value and vary b1 from 0.2 until 9. We notice
that a value of b1 = 0.4 produces the highest F1 score. In Figure 4 (b), we fix b1 = 0.4 and vary b2
from 0.2 until 9. We notice that the impact on F1 score of varying b2 is minimal as compared with
varying b1 and that the best F1 score is achieved at b2 = 3.0. Hence all our experiments are done
with b1 = 0.4 and b2 = 3.0.
6.5 Robustness of Various Techniques
Due to the non-convex nature of tensor decomposition, Figure 5 (a) shows the variations in the
F1 scores across ten different runs for each of the techniques, namely, Logistic CP with stochastic
partial natural gradient inference, BNBCP, BPTF and M-Zoom (unsupervised setting) for detecting
abusive reviewers.
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Figure 5: Robustness and Scalability.
BNBCP has the least variations across different runs, followed by the Logistic CP with stochastic
partial natural gradient based inference. M-Zoom (in magenta) requires the number of blocks
to be specified as input. Given the number of blocks, it produces identical sub-tensors across
different runs. Hence, we have measured the F1 score performance across different number of
blocks, monotonically varying them from 5 to 14. Below 5, the F1 score was much lower, hence it
is omitted. We see that with 8 blocks as input, the F1 score is at the highest and it beats the other
three methods. However, unlike the other three methods, M-Zoom does not produce a score for
each suspicious reviewer. That is, we cannot rank the reviewers according to their suspiciousness
(that shows that M-Zoom lacks a very important factor for taking enforcement actions).
6.6 Scalability of the proposed approach
We ran the logistic CP with partial natural gradient on the NO-SELLER-TENSOR dataset with
varying number of tuples. The hyper-parameters were fixed at the same setting mentioned above.
Figure 5 (b) shows the scalability of the proposed method across five different datasets of varying
sizes. We plot the time to converge (iteration number at which learning is saturated) in minutes
versus the size of the tensor (i.e., the number of tuples) in log scale. We notice an almost linear
increase in computational time to converge as the number of tuples increases. Our algorithm is also
easily parallellizable because in a given iteration, each tuple in the mini-batch can be processed
independently. This, we expect should help us in achieving much faster convergence than what we
are currently seeing. We are in the process of implementing a parallel version of our algorithm.
6.7 Impact of Early Detection of Abusive Reviewers
In this section, we present a retrospective analysis of the impact of our model as compared with
the existing system.
Early detection of abusive reviewers: Figure 6 (a) shows the fraction of suspicious reviewers
predicted by SENTINEL, that are later banned by existing models. The model is executed during
’Week0’ and 40% of the identified suspicious reviewers overlap with those banned by production
models. This overlap increases as we move forward by a week at a time, until five weeks later
(indicated by Week 5 ) when the overlap is roughly 80%. This indicates that roughly 40% of the
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reviewers that are detected by our model at Week 0 are detected across next 5 weeks by the pro-
duction system. The impact of not banning the abusive reviewers at Week 0 is captured by the
number of impressions created by the reviews from those abusive reviewers until Week 5.
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(b) Cumulative Impressions Count versus Time.
Figure 6: Impact of Early Detection.
Impact in terms of affected impression counts: Impressions implies the number of cus-
tomers who read the reviews (i.e., fake reviews) from those abusive reviewers until they were banned.
Note that banning a reviewer results in removal of all his/her reviews. Hence larger the impression
count implies more people have read those reviews which means bigger impact from not banning
these abusive reviewers early enough. Figure 6 (b) shows the cumulative impact in terms of the
number of impressions accumulated over consecutive weeks, from the time they were detected by
our model until their banning by existing production model. These impressions on fake reviews
quantify the potential impact of our model, once deployed in production.
6.8 Experiments on public data
To allow others to reproduce our results, we applied SENTINEL to the public Amazon Customer
Reviews dataset2 [HM16]. We selected the product categories Clothing, Shoes, and Jewelry, Home
and Kitchen and Sports and Outdoors for this test. Note that this data does not have seller
information. Also since this data is from May 1996 to July 2014, we do not have any labelled data,
i.e., known abusive reviewers corresponding to that period. To test SENTINEL, we used random
80% of the suspicious reviewers from M-Zoom to seed SENTINEL as well as the semi-supervised
version of BNBCP. The remaining 20% of the suspicious reviewers were considered as the test set.
On the test set, we obtain a 5.6% increase in AUC with SENTINEL as compared with the semi-
supervised BNBCP model and 5.9% increase in AUC compared with the best unsupervised model,
i.e., BPTF. Since we are considering M-Zoom’s output as the ground truth, we acknowledge that
this is not an ideal setting to validate the performance of the proposed approach. Having said that,
this setup at least allows us to loosely compare various methods.
2The dataset is available at http://jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon/.
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7 Conclusion
We formulated the problem of identifying abusive entities (i.e., sellers and reviewers) as a tensor
decomposition problem and proposed semi-supervised enhancements by incorporating binary multi-
target information for a subset of entities, i.e., known abusive sellers and/or reviewers. Our results
demonstrated that the proposed approach (titled SENTINEL) beats the state-of-the-art baselines
in detecting abusive entities.
We have shown, in the supplementary manuscript, that Po´lya-Gamma formulation simplifies
calculation of the partial Fisher information matrix, and hence proposed a scalable stochastic partial
natural gradient learning for inference of all the latent variables of the semi-supervised model. We
have empirically shown that our inference using stochastic partial natural gradient learning achieves
faster convergence than online EM using sufficient statistics and stochastic gradient learning.
Future Work: Given the equivalence between tensor decomposition and convolutional rectifier
networks [COA16], we would like to compare the performance of the latter (hierarchical Tucker)
with our probabilistic CP decomposition model. We also want to investigate the feasibility of
applying Graph Convolutional Networks to our multi-modal data (with data being either reviewers
and products and their relationships w.r.t. to rating as well as time of rating OR reviewers, products
and sellers and their relationships) to detect abusive entities.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Determine ~λ
~λ has a Gaussian prior whose variance is determined via Multiplicative Gamma Process [BD11,
Dur16] aka Adaptive Dimensionality Reduction technique that induces sparsity and automatically
deletes redundant parameters. The Multiplicative Gamma Process consists of a multiplicative
Gamma prior on the precision of a Gaussian distribution that induces a multiplicative Inverse-
Gamma prior on its variance parameter. Since its performance is sensitive to the hyper-parameter
settings of the Inverse-Gamma prior we follow certain strategies, shown in [Dur16], to set their
values. The generative model for λr for r in [1, R] and the Multiplicative Gamma Process are:
δl ∼ Inv-Gamma(al, 1)
λr ∼ N (0, τr),
where:
τr =
r∏
l=1
δl. (5)
The idea is that for increasing r, τr should be decreasing in a probabilistic sense. In other words,
the following stochastic order should be maintained with high probability, i.e.,
τ1 ≥ τ2 ≥ · · · ≥ τR.
To guarantee such a stochastic order with a high probability, as suggested in [Dur16], we need to
set a1 > 0 and ar > ar−1 and non-decreasing for all r > 1. Hence, we choose the hyper-parameters
values as follows:
a1 = 1
ar = a1 + (r − 1). 1
R
.
The update for δr in iteration t is given by (see [RWG
+14] for details):
δr =
1 +
∑R
h=r
λ2h
2
∏h
l=1,l 6=r
1
δl
0.5(R− r + 1) + ar + 1 . (6)
From (5), we can calculate the τrs in iteration t for r ∈ [1, R]. Denote ~τ as the vector consisting of
τr for r ∈ [1, R].
Let λr for r ∈ [1, R] denote an element of ~λ. We introduce auxiliary variables (Po´lya-Gamma
distributed variables [PSW13, PS12]), denoted by ωi for each element i of the input tensor data,
via data augmentation technique.
Consider a mini-batch defined at iteration t as It. Define for each i ∈ It and φi = ~λTAi where:
Ai denotes a vector consisting of elements A
r
i =
∏K
k=1 u
(k)
ik,r
for r ∈ [1, R]. Let A be the matrix
whose rows are Ai for i ∈ It. Let ωˆi for i ∈ It be the expected value of the auxiliary variable ωi
corresponding to the ith element of the input tensor data. The expected value of ωi has a closed-form
solution given by:
E[ωi] = ωˆi =
tanh(φi2 )
2φi
.
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The update for ~λ in iteration t, with the current mini-batch It, is obtained by maximizing the
natural logarithm of the posterior distribution of ~λ given by:
log[g(~λ)] := max
~λ
[[∑
i∈It
κiφi − ωiφ
2
i
2
]
−
[ (~λ√~τ)>(~λ√~τ)
2
]]
, (7)
where κi = yi− 12 and yi ∈ {0, 1}. And the operator  represents element-wise division between the
two vectors ~λ and ~τ . Note that (15) is a quadratic equation in φi i.e., ~λ, and hence has a closed-form
update.
A.2 Determine the coefficients ~β
(k)
l for l ∈ [1, L]
The generative model for β
(k)
l,r for r in [0, R], l in [1, L] is:
ρ
(k)
l,r ∼ Inv-Gamma(ac, b2),
β
(k)
l,r ∼ N (0, ρ(k)l,r
2
).
For mode k, we drop the notation (k) for all variables. Define for each i ∈ M where M denotes
the number of elements in mode k that have binary side information corresponding to one or more
targets. The logistic function i.e., the likelihood Ll,m corresponding to element m with label zl,m is
given by:
Ll,m = 1
1 + exp[−zl,m~β>l ~˜um]
,
where ~˜um denotes ~um prepended with 1 to account for the bias. With introduction of Po´lya-Gamma
variables [PSW13] denoted by ~νl for task l, the likelihood with the data augmentation becomes:
Ll,m = exp(zl,m.ψl,m
2
− νˆl,m.
ψ2l,m
2
),
where:
ψl,m = ~β
>
l (~˜um)
E[νl,m] = νˆl,m =
tanh(
ψl,m
2 )
2ψl,m
(8)
The update for ~βl in iteration t is obtained by maximizing the natural logarithm of the posterior
distribution of ~βl given by:
F (~βl) := max
~βl
[ M∑
m=1
[zl,m
ψl,m
2
− νl,m
ψ2l,m
2
]
−(
~βl  ~ρl)>(~βl  ~ρl)
2
−
∑
j 6=l
Ql,j [~β
>
l Sign(
~βj)]
]
.
(9)
Equation (20) is a quadratic equation in ~βl and hence has a closed-form update. And the operator
 represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~βl and ~ρl.
Subsequently, the update for ρ2l,r at time step t is given by:
ρ2l,r(t) =
β2l,r(t−1)
2ac + 3
+
2b1
2ac + 3
. (10)
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A.3 Determine the factors ~u
(k)
ik,r
for mode k
The generative model for u
(k)
ik,r
is:
u
(k)
ik,r
∼ N (0, µ2ik,r)
µ2ik,r ∼ Inv-Gamma(ac, b1) with target information
µ2ik,r ∼ Inv-Gamma(ac, b2) without target information.
The Inverse-Gamma hyper-prior on the variance parameter of the Gaussian prior for u
(k)
ik,r
provides
adaptive L2-Regularization. The Inverse-Gamma parameters are set so that greater amount of
regularization is provided for mode k that has target information. Denote ~uk,ik as the R dimension
vector consisting of factors u
(k)
ik,r
corresponding to element ik in mode k and r ∈ [1, R]. Define for each
i ∈ It, ik = n, and φi = (~u(k)ik=n)T ~Cik=n, where each element of ~Cik=n is Cik=n,r = λr.
∏K
k′ 6=k u
(k
′
)
i
k
′ ,r
for r ∈ [1, R]. Let C(k) be the matrix whose rows are ~Cik .
Mode k without target information: For mode k, we drop the notation (k) for all variables.
The update for ~uik=n in iteration t is obtained by maximizing the natural logarithm of the posterior
distribution of ~uik=n given by:
H(~uik=n) := max~uik=n
[∑
i∈It:ik=n[
φi
2 −
ωiφ
2
i
2 ]
(~uik=n~µik=n)>(~uik=n~µik=n)
2
]
,
(11)
where the operator  represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~uik=n and ~µik=n.
Equation (21) is a quadratic equation in ~uik=n and hence has a closed-form update.
Subsequently the update for µ2ik=n,r at time step t is given by:
µ2ik=n,r(t) =
u2ik=n,r(t−1)
2ac + 3
+
2b2
2ac + 3
. (12)
Mode k with binary target information: Given binary target information for mode k we
drop the notation (k) for all variables. Let zl,n denote the binary label (either +1 or −1) for element
n for task l. Let νl,n correspond to the data augmented variable that is Po´lya-Gamma distributed
for element the n and task l.
The update for ~uik=n in iteration t is obtained by maximizing the natural logarithm of the
posterior distribution of ~uik=n given by:
H(~uik=n) := max~uik=n
[∑
i∈It:ik=n[
φi
2 −
ωiφ
2
i
2 ]
− (~uik=n~µik=n)
>(~uik=n~µik=n)
2
+
∑L
l=1[zl,n
~u>ik=n
~ˆ
lβ
2 −
νˆl,n[β0,l+~u
>
ik=n
~ˆ
βl]
2
2 ]
]
,
(13)
where
~ˆ
βl denotes the vector of R coefficients without the bias. Note that in (22) we are training a
Logistic model using the binary target information to detect abusive entities. And the operator 
represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~uik=n and ~µik=n. Also (22) is a quadratic
equation in ~uik=n and hence has a closed-form update.
Subsequently the update for µ2ik=n,r at time step t is given by:
µ2ik=n,r(t) =
u2ik=n,r(t−1)
2ac + 3
+
2b1
2ac + 3
. (14)
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Algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code for the multi-target semi-supervised CP tensor decomposition
using partial natural gradients.
Algorithm 1 Partial Natural Gradient.
1. Randomly initialize ~τ , ~λ, ~u
(1)
1 . . . ~u
(K)
nK and ~β
(1)
l · · · ~β(K)L .
2. Set the step-size schedule γt appropriately.
3. repeat
(a) Sample (with replacement) mini-batch It from the training data.
(b) For i ∈ It set
– Ari =
∏K
k=1 u
(k)
ik,r
for r ∈ [1, R]
– ωˆi =
tanh(
φi
2 )
2φi
where φi = ~λ
>Ai
– Nii =
1[
exp[−φi2 ]+exp[
φi
2 ]
]2 .
(c) For k ∈ [1,K] and l ∈ [1, L] (where applicable) set
– C
(k)
ik=n,r
= λr
∏K
k′ 6=k u
(k′)
ik′ ,r
for r ∈ [1, R]
– For entity ik = m with binary target information z
(k)
l,m:
νˆ
(k)
l,m =
tanh(
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )
2ψ
(k)
l,m
where ψ
(k)
l,m =
~βl
(k)>~˜uik=m
Ol:m=n =
1[
exp[−ψl,m=n2 ]+exp[
ψl,m=n
2 ]
]2
– Compute gradient and partial Fisher information matrix
w.r.t. ~β
(k)
l and update
~β
(k)
l using (4).
– Update ρl,r
(k)2 using (10).
– Compute gradient and partial Fisher information matrix
w.r.t. ~u
(k)
ik:i∈It and update ~u
(k)
ik:i∈It using (4).
– Update µ2ik:i∈It,r using (12) or (14).
(d) Compute gradient and partial Fisher information matrix w.r.t. ~λ
and update ~λ using (4).
(e) Update ~τ using (5).
4. until forever
B Computation of Partial Fisher information matrix
Partial Fisher information matrix w.r.t. ~λ
Consider the exponent of the function to be maximized w.r.t. ~λ, which is:
g(~λ) = exp
[∑
i∈It
κiφi − ωiφ
2
i
2
]
exp
[
− (
~λ√~τ)>(~λ√~τ)
2
]
, (15)
where κi = yi − 12 and yi ∈ {0, 1}. And the operator  represents element-wise division between
the two vectors ~λ & ~τ .
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The first exponential term of the right hand side (RHS) of (15) is the joint conditional likelihood
of the binary outcome yi ∈ {0, 1}, denoted as P (yi|~λ,Ai) and the conditional likelihood of the
Po´lya-Gamma distributed variable (from data augmentation) denoted as P (ωi|~λ,Ai). The second
exponential term of the RHS of (15) is the Gaussian prior on ~λ with variance ~τ . The stochastic
natural gradient ascent-style updates for ~λ at step t is given as:
~λ(t) = ~λ(t−1) + γt.I(~λ(t−1))−1 E
yi,ωi:i∈It
[
∇~λ log[g(~λ)]
]
, (16)
where γt in (16) is given by the following equation:
γt =
1
(τp + t)θ
.
I(~λ(t−1))−1 in (16) denotes the inverse of the partial Fisher information matrix whose size is R×R
since the second order derivatives are computed only w.r.t. ~λ.
Note that the joint likelihood term in (15) is un-normalized. The partial Fisher information
matrix is computed only w.r.t. the data i.e., yi. To do this, we first compute the expectation w.r.t.
the data augmented variable ωi. The resulting equation is a Logistic function from the following
identity:
exp[φi]
yi
1 + exp[φi]
=
exp[κiφi]
2
∫ ∞
0
exp[−ωiφ
2
i
2
]p(ωi)dωi. (17)
There is a closed-form solution for the integral in (17), hence we obtain:
exp[φi]
yi
1 + exp[φi]
=
exp[κiφi]
2
1
cosh[φi2 ]
. (18)
Equation (18) is a normalized likelihood for each i ∈ It and let it be denoted by Li. Using the
definition of hyperbolic cosine, (18) becomes:
Li =
exp
[
κiφi
]
exp
[
−φi2
]
+ exp
[
φi
2
] .
To this end, the partial Fisher Information with respect to ~λ for Li and i ∈ It is given by:
IL(~λ) = − E
yi:i∈It
[∑
i∈It
∂2log[Li]
∂~λ2
]
= [A>ItN ItAIt ],
where AIt denotes the matrix whose rows are Ai for i ∈ It and N It denotes the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are Nii; where:
Nii =
1[
exp[−φi2 ] + exp[φi2 ]
]2 .
The prior term is accounted by considering its variance as a conditioner, hence the conditioned
partial Fisher Information matrix for the parameter ~λ at step t is given by:
I(~λ(t−1)) = [A>ItN ItAIt ] + diag[~τ(t−1)]−1, (19)
where diag[~τ(t−1)]−1 denotes inverse of a diagonal matrix whose diagonal is ~τ(t−1).
24
Partial Fisher information matrix w.r.t. ~β
(k)
l for task l in mode k
The function to be maximized w.r.t. ~β
(k)
l is:
F (~β
(k)
l ) =
[ M∑
m=1
[z
(k)
l,m
ψ
(k)
l,m
2
− ν
(k)
l,mψl,m
(k)2
2
]− (
~β
(k)
l  ~ρ(k)l )>(~β(k)l  ~ρ(k)l )
2
]
]
, (20)
where the operator  represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~β(k)l & ~ρ(k)l .
Let U˜
(k)
M be the matrix whose rows are ~˜u
(k)
ik=m
for m ∈ [1,M ] for mode k with target information.
We compute the partial Fisher information matrix I(~β
(k)
l (t−1)) similar to ~λ as:
I(~β(k)l ) = [U˜
(k)
M ]
>Ol,M U˜
(k)
M + diag[~ρl
(k)2]−1,
where the Ol,M is the diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are Ol:m,m where:
Ol:m,m =
1[
exp[−ψ
(k)
l,m
2 ] + exp[
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 ]
]2 .
Partial Fisher information matrix w.r.t. ~u
(k)
ik=n
for mode k: Without Target Infor-
mation
The function to be maximized w.r.t. factor ~u
(k)
ik=n
is:
H(~u
(k)
ik=n
) =
[∑
i∈It:ik=n[
φi
2 −
ωiφ
2
i
2 ]−
(~u
(k)
ik=n
~µik=n)>(~u
(k)
ik=n
~µik=n)
2
]
, (21)
where the operator  represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~u(k)ik=n & ~µik=n.
Similarly we can compute the partial Fisher information for ~u
(k)
ik=n
corresponding to element n
in mode k as:
I(~u(k)ik=n(t−1)) = [C(k)n ]>NnC(k)n + diag[~µ2ik=n]−1,
where C
(k)
n is a matrix whose rows are ~Cik=n for i ∈ It and Nn is the diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements Ni:ik=n is given by:
Ni:ik=n =
1[
exp[−φi:ik=n2 ] + exp[
φi:ik=n
2 ]
]2 .
Partial Fisher information matrix w.r.t. ~u
(k)
ik=n
for mode k: With Binary Target
Information
The function to be maximized w.r.t. factor ~u
(k)
ik=n
is:
H(~u
(k)
ik=n
) =
[∑
i∈It:ik=n[
φi
2 −
ωiφ
2
i
2 ]−
(~u
(k)
ik=n
~µik=n)>(~u
(k)
ik=n
~µik=n)
2
+
∑L
l=1[z
(k)
l,n .
(~u
(k)
ik=n
)> ~ˆβ(k)l
2 −
ν
(k)
l,n [β
(k)
0,l +(~u
(k)
ik=n
)> ~ˆβ(k)l ]
2
2 ]
]
,
(22)
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where the operator  represents element-wise division between the two vectors ~u(k)ik=n & ~µik=n. Note
that (22) does not have the non-negativity constraint since we are training a Logistic model using
the binary target information to detect abusive entities.
Similarly we can compute the partial Fisher information for ~u
(k)
ik=n
corresponding to element n
in mode k as:
I(~u(k)ik=n(t−1)) = [C(k)n ]>NnC(k)n +
∑L
l=1[
~β
(k)
l ]
>Ol:m=n~β
(k)
l + diag[~µ
2
ik=n
]−1,
where Ol:m=n is:
Ol:m=n =
1[
exp[−ψ
(k)
l,m=n
2 ] + exp[
ψ
(k)
l,m=n
2 ]
]2 .
C Computation of the gradient
Gradient w.r.t. ~λ
To update ~λ, we compute the gradient of the natural logarithm of (15) as:
Eyi,ωi:i∈It
[
∇~λ log[g(~λ)]
]
= Eyi,ωi:i∈It
[[∑
i∈It κiAi −A>i ωi(Ai~λ)
]
− diag[~λ ~τ ]
]
. (23)
Separating out terms independent of yi & ωi and replacing with matrix operations where appli-
cable; the RHS of (23) becomes:∑
i∈It
E
yi
[
κi
]
Ai −
[
A>ItωˆItAIt + diag[~τ ]
−1
]
~λ,
where ωˆIt is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are ωˆi, where:
ωˆi = E[ωi] =
tanh(φi2 )
2φi
.
Now κi = −0.5 if yi = 0 and κi = 0.5 if yi = 1. Hence:
Eyi
[
κi|yi = 0
]
= −0.5 exp(−
φi
2
)
exp(−φi
2
)+exp(
φi
2
)
and
Eyi
[
κi|yi = 1
]
= 0.5
exp(
φi
2
)
exp(−φi
2
)+exp(
φi
2
)
.
Gradient w.r.t. ~β
(k)
l
To update ~β
(k)
l , we compute the gradient of (20) as:
Ez(k)l,m,ν(k)l,m:m∈[1,M ]
[
∇~β(k)l F (
~β
(k)
l )
]
= Ez(k)l,m,ν(k)l,m:m∈[1,M ]
[∑M
m=1[z
(k)
l,m
~˜u
(k)
ik=m
2
−(~˜u(k)ik=m
>
ν
(k)
l,m~˜u
(k)
ik=m
)~β
(k)
l ]− diag[~β(k)l  ~ρl]
]
.
(24)
Separating out terms independent of z
(k)
l,m & ν
(k)
l,m and replacing with matrix operations where applicable; the
RHS of (24) becomes:
M∑
m=1
E
z
(k)
l,m
[
z(k)m
] ~˜u(k)ik=m
2
−
[
U˜
(k)>
M νˆ
(k)
l,M U˜
(k)
M + diag[~ρ
(k)2]−1
]
~β
(k)
l ,
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Figure 7: AUC Box Plot: Detecting Abusive Sellers.
where νˆ
(k)
l,M is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are νˆ
(k)
l,m, where:
Subsequently:
Ez(k)l,m
[
z
(k)
l,m|label(k)m = 0
]
= − exp(−
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )
exp(−ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )+exp(
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )
and
Ez(k)l,m
[
z
(k)
l,m|label(k)m = 1
]
=
exp(
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )
exp(−ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )+exp(
ψ
(k)
l,m
2 )
.
Gradient w.r.t. ~u
(k)
ik=n
: Without Target Information
To update ~u
(k)
ik=n
, we compute the gradient of (21) as:∑
i∈It:ik=n
E
yi
[
κi
]
C
(k)
ik=n
−
[
C(k)n
>
ωˆnC
(k)
n + diag[~µ
2
ik=n
]−1
]
~u
(k)
ik=n
,
where ωˆn is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are ωˆi∈It:ik=n.
Gradient w.r.t. ~u
(k)
ik=n
: With Binary Target Information
To update ~u
(k)
ik=n
, we compute the gradient of (22) as:
∑
i∈It:ik=n Eyi
[
κi
]
C
(k)
ik=n
+
∑L
l=1 Ez(k)l,m=n
[
z
(k)
l,m=n
]
~ˆβ
(k)
l
2 −
[
C(k)n
>
ωˆnC
(k)
n + diag[~µ
2
ik=n
]−1 −∑Ll=1(~ˆβ(k)l >νˆ(k)l,m=n ~ˆβ(k)l )]~u(k)ik=n.
D Confidence Interval for AUC
Detection Abusive Sellers
Figure 7 shows the confidence intervals (box plot) of AUC across eleven runs of the BNBCP and Logistic
CP (Natural Gradient 1) semi-supervised models on the SELLER− TENSOR data.
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